Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology
He has authored over four hundred and fifty research papers and over thirty research monographs. He is editor of several international Journals, and many reference works and Handbooks of Logic. We are always looking for ways to improve customer experience on Elsevier. We would like to ask you for a moment of your time to fill in a short questionnaire, at the end of your visit. If you decide to participate, a new browser tab will open so you can complete the survey after you have completed your visit to this website.
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Gabbay John Woods. Hardcover ISBN: Imprint: North Holland. It has the wrong conception of biological kinds, of biological heritability, and of how genes and hormones work. In: Blockheads! Pautz and D. What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. I will show that most of them have serious drawbacks.
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Overall, the best view is to accept that attention may distort perception, sacrificing veridicality for usability. I end my discussion by showing how to develop that view. This is the same paper, except for the title. Consciousness and No Self? But is there in fact a role for the self in phenomenal consciousness?
According to the phenomenal no-self challenge, reflection on the character of phenomenal consciousness reveals no self and no subjectivity. I articulate an argument for this challenge based on the transparency of conscious experience. I then respond to this argument and show that there is an aspect of phenomenal consciousness that the challengers miss.
This aspect is active attention. In active attention, in particular in the ability to actively resist distractions, consciousness reveals an agential self: the experiencer is phenomenally manifest as an active power. Montague and A. Grzankowski, Oxford University Press I argue first that attention is a maybe the paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode.
In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other propositional or non-propositional mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude.
It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from an atomistic, building block picture to a more holistic, structural picture. The article puts specific emphasis on the relevance of how to draw the perception-cognition distinction in the first place, and the role of attention in the cognitive penetrability debate.
Hence they often speak of the way an experience represents the environment to be, or what there is. In this respect perceptual experience is thus assumed to resemble a speech act like assertion or a mental state like belief. There is another important form of intentionality though that concerns not what there is, but what to do. I call this a guiding form of intentionality.
In speech, there are — for example — imperatives and among intentional mental states there are desires and intentions. In this paper I argue that perceptual experience is at least sometimes characterized by such a guiding form of intentionality. Perception does not just inform, it is sometimes intrinsically action-guiding.
I call this the perceptual guidance claim. I distinguish the perceptual guidance claim from related, but importantly distinct claims such as claims concerning the perception of affordances or concerning whether perception is normative , and argue that perceptual action guidance occurs not just in an unconscious vision-for-action system, but also within conscious perceptual experience.
This paper considers how the attentional organization of consciousness into centre and periphery bears on the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Two ideas are discussed: according to the first, the attentional organization of consciousness shows that phenomenal holism is true. I argue that the argument from attentional organization to phenomenal holism remains inconclusive. According to the second idea, attentional organization provides a principle of unity for conscious experience, i.
Conscious experience provides subjects with a subjective perspective, or point of view, because its various parts are structured by attention into what is more central and what is more peripheral. Philosophical Studies 3 : Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness.
I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, I argue specifically against an initially plausible range of views that assume a close match between the temporal content of visual experience and the temporal layout of experience itself.
Against such a widely held structural matching thesis I argue that which temporal changes we are experiencing bears no close relation to how our experience itself is changing over time.
Visual Perception Theory
Explanations of the silencing illusions that are compatible with the structural matching thesis fail. Philosophy Compass , 6 11 : — What is the philosophical significance of attention?
jordirocas.com/tmp/185/xebig-como-rastrear-iphone.php The present article provides an overview of recent debates surrounding the connections between attention and other topics of philosophical interest. In particular it discusses the interplay between attention and consciousness, attention and agency, and the role attention might play for the theory of reference and in epistemology.
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The article provides an overview of the logical landscape: it clearly distinguishes the various questions concerning — among others — how attention shapes the phenomenal character of experience, whether it is necessary or sufficient for consciousness, or whether it plays a special role in the best philosophical theory of action or conceptual reference.
The article points out various interdependencies between particular answers to these questions, as well as how these answers might depend on the metaphysics of attention like whether attention may come in degrees, or whether it is fundamentally a personal level or sub-personal phenomenon. Philosophy Compass , 6 11 : — What is attention? Attention is often seen as a subject matter for the hard sciences of cognitive and brain processes, and is understood in terms of sub-personal mechanisms and processes.
Correspondingly, there still is a stark contrast between the central role attention plays for the empirical investigation of the mind in psychology and the neurosciences, and its relative neglect in philosophy.
Yet, over the past years, several philosophers have challenged the standard conception. A number of interesting philosophical questions concerning the nature of attention arise. This article provides an introduction to contemporary debates concerning these questions. In particular, it discusses the question of how the pre-theoretic conception of attention might be reconciled with a scientific conception, arguments that provide support for an anti-reductivist theory of attention, and sketches several recent anti-reductivist theories and their inter-relations.
In: Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays , eds. Mole C. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception of attention.